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Relations de dominance et classement des universités 
Résumé 
Cet article propose une théorie permettant d'établir des relations de dominance 
entre universités sur la base de leur production scientifique et du nombre de 
citations reçues dans une certaine fenêtre temporelle. Cette théorie est appliqué au 
classement des Universités Françaises. 
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Dominance relations and universities ranking 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a theory for establishing dominance relations between 
universities on the basis of their scientific production and the number of citations 
their publications received in given time window. We apply this theory to the 
ranking of French Universities. 
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In a context of rising competition for funds and students, the ranking of universities and departments
has recently been the subject of a strong interest from the public and the managers of these institu-
tions. Such rankings are also increasingly viewed as policy leverages. For instance, in the European
context, universities rankings are often expected to increase the competition between universities
across countries and to contribute to creating an integrated research and higher education system.
Nevertheless, the available rankings seem to rely more on ad hoc techniques rather than on clear
theoretical grounds. As a consequence, such rankings provide only weakly reliable information and
are of a limited interest for the public, for the managers of these institutions as well as for policy
makers.
This article provides a simple rationale to establish one-to-one dominance relations1 between the
scientiﬁc production of any given set of institutions, from which the ranking of these institutions
can be established. The core of the proposed methodology is to provide a satisfactory treatment of
the visibility of institutions in diﬀerent segments of “scientiﬁc credit”. Dominance relations between
universities are established by broad scientiﬁc domains.
For that purpose, we introduce the notion of valuation function which gives a “value” to any
article on the basis of the number of citations it received in a given time window. Depending of
what the term value may refer to, one can retain diﬀerent assumptions on the properties of the
valuation function. Our goal is indeed not to propose any speciﬁc functional form for the valuation
function, but to show how classes of valuation functions do transform into simple dominance relations
of various strength between institutions. Moreover, the notion of upward dominance is introduced
which allows us to focus only on high segments of scientiﬁc credit, that is to not consider publications
that received less than a given number of citations. We show that all dominance relations have the
transitivity property and that a hierarchy between the dominance relations do exist: a dominance
relation of an university on an other university implies all weaker relations. Therefore, the more
complete the dominance relation, the weaker its strength.
The main goal of this article is to show and discuss to what extent rankings can be inferred from
such dominance relations. We distinguish complete dominance ranking which can deduced from
dominance relations from pseudo dominance ranking which use the dominance relations to build
indexes which in turn can ground rankings. The absence of any dominance relation is also used to
deﬁne classes of universities among which “best(s) in class” institution(s) can be identiﬁed (they may
constitute good models to compete with for the other institutions in the class).
This methodology is applied and calibrated on the set of French universities, relying upon their
publications and the citation scores of these articles. Data are constituted of the detailed infor-
mation on the publication of all French Universities as they appear in the ISI-WOS.2 These data
1The term “dominance” refers to the stochastic dominance relations between distributions ﬁrst used by von Neuman
and Morgenstern (1944) in their major contribution to the theory of choice under uncertainty. Nevertheless, our notion
is diﬀerent as it shall become explicit below.
2These data are collected in house by the Observatiore des Sciences et Techniques through a very detailed and
precise tehcniques that involve directly the intitutions themselves for the selection of the appropriate list of addresses
mentioned in publications.
1are particularly precise thanks to an interactive data collection and cleaning process involving the
universities themselves so as to get rid of the variety of signing patterns among the research staﬀ of
these institutions.
The article is organized as follows. The basic notations on the scientiﬁc production of universities
and its value are introduced in the second section. The dominance relations and their conditions
of relevance are proposed in the third section. The fourth section presents how such dominance
relations can be used to produce universities ranking and reference classes. In the ﬁfth section, we
derive a generic transitivity property of the dominance relations and show how they are linked to
each other. The sixth section is dedicated to the calibration of the theory relying upon data on the
French universities. The last section concludes.
2 Articles, citations and value
Let us deﬁne Θk





￿ ￿∀s ∈ N
￿
, with fk
i (s) the publication performance with “visibility” s. In this paper we
consider that, within a given domain, visibility is measured by the number of citations received in
a given time window after publication.3 The precise possible computations of scientiﬁc performance
fk
i (s) are presented in detail in Section 6. It is not useful to go into such details at this stage. It is
only necessary to know that fk
i (s) is continuous by construction, non negative and becomes null after
some value of s which will diﬀer across institutions and ﬁelds. The total number of i’s publications





Let’s now deﬁne the function vk(s) as the valuation function which gives the “value” of any article
given its visibility s. The function vk(s) is domain dependent and built as follows:
vk(s) = ωk   v(s), (1)
with ωk a ﬁeld dependent normalization constant that traduces the various average levels of visibility
of the domains. In the next section, several dominance relations are deﬁned for diﬀerent assumptions
one can make on the function v(s). Before doing so, let us deﬁne the value of the whole publication





















/ωk the non-normalized value of the scientiﬁc production in a given domain. Since
it lighten slightly the exposure, it will be used for the within domains comparisons of institutions
whereas the normalized value is preferably used in the interdisciplinary approach.
3 Dominance relations
We now introduce several dominance relations: strong dominance, dominance and weak dominance.
Each dominance relation holds for diﬀerent assumptions on the function v(s). Lemmas establish the
3Alternatively, one could also consider the journals Impact Factor as an appropriate (though more indirect) visibility
measure. More complex measurement techniques could also take into account where do citations come from, for instance
as suggested by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004).
2necessary and suﬃcient conditions for each dominance relation to hold. Next upward dominance
relations are introduced. Upward dominance relations only depart from the former dominance rela-
tions in that they only take into account the scientiﬁc production among the most visible articles in
the ﬁeld.
3.1 Strong dominance
We now deﬁne the notion of strong dominance over the set of institutions I. This dominance relation
requires only the function v(s) to be non negative, that is no article will contribute negatively to the
scientiﬁc performance of any institution. This assumption is likely to be consistent for any diﬀerent
precise understanding of the value notion.
Deﬁnition 1 The scientiﬁc production of institution i in ﬁeld k strongly dominates the one of in-







Lemma 1 i ◮k j if and only if ∀x ∈ [0,∞[,fk
i (x) ≥ fk
j (x).
Proof. See Appendix A.
That is, a university strongly dominates another one in ﬁeld k, if it’s publication performance is
greater in all possible citation classes.
3.2 Dominance
We now turn to the notion of dominance. The dominance relation requires the function v(s) to be
again non negative and now also non decreasing, that is articles which receive more citations have a
higher value (within a given domain). This assumption is again likely to be consistent for diﬀerent
value notion. More cited papers have been more noticed: they are likely to have contributed more
to the advancement of knowledge. They also contribute more to the visibility of the institution.
Deﬁnition 2 The scientiﬁc production of institution i in ﬁeld k dominates the one of institution j,














Proof. See Appendix A.
3.3 Weak dominance
The notion of weak dominance requires the function v(s) to be in addition to the above mentioned
properties to be also weakly convex. That assumption implies that the value function gives propor-
tional or more than proportional weight to highly cited papers. If v(s) accounts for the social value
of knowledge, this assumption would be barely acceptable since the arrival of citations is known to
be a cumulative process. More cited papers are also more widely known and are thus more likely
to be cited. More, citation fads tend to appear so that the number of citations would increase more
3than proportionally with real social value4. Alternatively, if v(s) accounts for the contribution of the
paper to the visibility of the parent institution, then the weak convexity assumption is more likely
to be consistent since universities CEOs and their trustees are usually more willing the institution to
be performing in the higher segments of visibility whereas weakly cited papers tend to be less than
proportionally considered.
Deﬁnition 3 The scientiﬁc production of institution i in ﬁeld k weakly dominates the one of insti-














Proof. See Appendix A.
3.4 Upward dominance relations
We now consider the possibility that the dominance relations introduced so far are to be established
only for high citation classes, that is only considering a certain share of the most cited articles in the
ﬁeld. To do so, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne s
φ
k as the smallest visibility a paper may exhibit among the
φ% most visible papers in the ﬁeld k (in the world). We can then deﬁne, for each type of dominance,
its corresponding upward dominance notion and introduce the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
such dominance relation to hold. This is the purpose of the following three deﬁnitions and lemmas.
The proofs of the lemmas are obviously extended from the proofs of the three ﬁrst lemmas (see
appendix) and are thus omitted.
Deﬁnition 4 The scientiﬁc production of institution i in ﬁeld k upward strongly dominates at or-
der φ the one of institution j, noted i ◮
φ













Lemma 4 i ⊲
φ







i (x) ≥ fk
j (x).
Proof. The proof derives trivially from Lemma 1.
Deﬁnition 5 The scientiﬁc production of institution i in ﬁeld k upward dominates at order φ the one
of institution j, noted i ⊲
φ













Lemma 5 i ⊲
φ













4The distribution of paper according to the number of citations received is known to be highly skew: few researchers
publish many articles and many researchers each publishing only few papers. The shape of the distribution can be
well approximated by an inverse power distribution (Power Law) given by the following function: f(n) = an
−k with
f(n) the number of authors having published n papers, a and k being the parameters of the law. When k = 2, this
expression is identical to the one initially proposed by Lotka (1926). Many empirical studies conﬁrmed of the relevance
of such distribution for diﬀerent scientiﬁc domains: e.g. Murphy (1973) for Humanities, Radhakrishnan and Kernizan
(1979) in Computer sciences, Cox and Chung (1991) in Economics, etc.
4Proof. The proof derives trivially from Lemma 2.
Deﬁnition 6 The scientiﬁc production of institution i in ﬁeld k upward weakly dominates at order φ
the one of institution j, noted i  
φ
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Proof. The proof derives trivially from Lemma 3.
It should be noticed that the upward dominance relations are obviously generalization of the
dominance relations introduced in Deﬁnitions 1, 2 and 3 which are equivalent to upward dominance
relations at order 1.
4 The properties of dominance relations
This section presents the properties of the dominance relations. It is ﬁrst shown that all dominance
relations share the transitivity property. Next, a theorem which summarizes the causal relations
between dominance relations is introduced.
4.1 Transitivity
Lemma 7 All the dominance relations introduced are transitive, that is, with symbol ≻ accounting




k or  
φ
k, ∀φ ∈ ]0,1]), if i ≻ j and j ≻ h,
then i ≻ h.
Proof. The proof derives trivially from the Deﬁnitions 1 to 6.
4.2 Relations between dominance relations
The deﬁnition below establishes that a dominance relation is stronger than another one if a dominance
of the former type between two institutions necessarily implies a dominance of the latter between
these two institutions. .
Deﬁnition 7 A dominance relation ≻ is stronger than dominance relation ≻′, noted ≻≫≻′, if, ∀i,j,
i ≻ j implies i ≻′ j.
The theorem introduces causal relations between the dominance relations.



















Proof. The proof derives straightforwardly from the Deﬁnitions 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Thus the weaker a dominance relation the more dominance relations it is possible to establish
between the institutions of any given set I.
55 Rankings and reference classes
We now turn to the use of the dominance relations for the implementation of ranking procedures
and reference classes. For that purpose, we ﬁrst deﬁne dominance networks which constitute both a
robust manner to write down formally the structuration of dominance relations between institutions
of a given set and a convenient way to picture it. Next two types of dominance ranking are introduced
(complete dominance ranking and pseudo dominance ranking). Lastly, it is shown how the dominance
relations can be used to implement reference classes.
5.1 Directed dominance networks
We can deﬁne a directed network of dominance relations between institutions. Let us consider ≻,




k or  
φ
k, with ∀φ ∈
]0,1]). Let’s build the (directed) dominance network   g associated to dominance relation ≻ and the
institutions set I by writing a link from institution i to institution j if i dominates j. That is formally:
∀i,j ∈ I,ij ∈   g if i ≻ j.
In this network, transitive dominance triplets (without ex aequos) are uninformative since we
know that the transitivity property holds. Therefore, for picturing purposes, it is convenient to deﬁne
the adjusted dominance network   g′ which is derived from   g by deleting such triplets. Formally, we
begin to build   g′ by assigning a link from i to j if ij ∈   g. But ∀i,j,k ∈ I, if ij,ik,jk ∈   g and kj / ∈   g
then ik / ∈   g′.
5.2 Complete dominance rankings
A ranking over a set I, written RI is a vector of dimension #I with unitary element ri ∈ N giving
the rank of institution i. A ranking, conventionally written R≻
I , is said to be based on a dominance
relation ≻ if it is possible to attribute a rank ri,∀i ∈ I, from the series of inequalities ri < rj
established each time i ≻ j.5 Nevertheless not all dominance relations can constitute the basis of
a ranking. We shall show that such ranking over set I can only be constructed on the basis of an
I-complete dominance relation deﬁned below. Such a ranking is thus called a complete dominance
ranking over I.
Deﬁnition 8 A dominance relation ≻ is said to be I-complete if ∀i,j ∈ I,i ≻ j or j ≻ i.
When a dominance relation is complete over a set I, then one can always establish (at least) such
a dominance relation between any two institutions of I. Then, ranking these institutions becomes
an easy and unambiguous task on the basis of that dominance relation.
Lemma 9 A (complete) dominance ranking R≻
I can be constructed over institutions set I on the
basis of dominance relation ≻ if and only if ≻ is an I-complete dominance relation.
Proof. If ≻ is an I-complete dominance relation then ∀i,j ∈ I, it can always be inferred that
ri < rj or (and, when i and j are ex aequos) rj < ri and thus a ranking can be established. If a
5If i ≻ j and j ≻ i then i and j are ex aequos, that is ri = rj. The rank of ex aequos is set to the median of the
possible ranks, conventionally choosing the minimal value when the median is ambiguous.
6ranking can be established on institutions set I the it can be inferred that ri < rj or (and, when i
and j when ex aequos) rj < ri, which is equivalent to setting that i ≻ j or (and) j ≻ i, and thus the
relation ≻ is an I-complete dominance relation. 
Lemma 10 The dominance network   g associated with any I-complete dominance relation ≻ is one-
sided complete, that is ∀i,j ∈ I, with i  = j, then ij ∈   g or ji ∈   g.
Proof. Straightforward and thus omitted.
5.3 Pseudo dominance rankings
A more indirect procedure can be established to build a ranking from a dominance relation. It relies
on a score computed thanks to that dominance relation. In the pseudo dominance ranking deﬁned
below, the proposed score is the number of institutions an institution dominates.
Deﬁnition 9 A pseudo dominance ranking R′≻
I over a given set of institutions I is established on
the basis of the number of dominance relations of type ≻ which emanate from each institution over
the remaining other institutions in I. The score of institution i is ni = #{j ∈ I |i  = j,i ≻ j}.
Pseudo dominance rankings are less reliable than the complete dominance rankings but have
the considerable advantage that they can always be produced on the basis of any given dominance
relation.
5.4 Reference classes
The fact that a dominance relation can not be established between two institutions tells that the two
institutions are, to some extent, similar and thus comparable. Building on this idea, we introduce the
notion of reference class: the reference class of institution i and associated with dominance relation
≻, is the set of institutions noted c≻
i ⊆ I. The deﬁnition follows.
Deﬁnition 10 ∀k ∈ I, k ∈ c≻
i ⊆ I if i ⊁ k and k ⊁ i.
Notice that then all institutions belong to their own reference class and that the relation is
reciprocal (that is, if k ∈ c≻
i then i ∈ c≻
k ).
Theorem 11 For any dominance relations ≻ and ≻′, if ≻≫≻′ then ∀i, c≻
i ⊆ c≻′
i .
Proof. The proof derives straightforwardly from Theorem 8 and Deﬁnition 10.
Moreover, pseudo ranking R′≻
I can be used to ﬁnd reference institutions within reference classes:
universities managers are interested by the universities they would like to look like among the ones
their university does not diﬀer too much.
6 Calibration exercises on French universities
Several solutions have been introduced so far to rank research institutions and produce reference
classes according to several dominance relations. The purpose of this section is to test and cali-
brate the various possibilities thanks to publications data of French universities. The data are ﬁrst
presented and the calibration exercise follows.
76.1 The Data
The data come from the French national program for recording the publications of French universities
(IPERU) operated by the French national institute dedicated to the production of information on
sciences and technologies (OST, Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques). Due to the complexity
of the French research system, there is a great variety of patterns of referencing the employing
institution which in turn leads to great diﬃculties in recording the publication output of universities.
To overcome that diﬃculty, the program relies upon the validation, by the research support services
of the universities, of the correct list of signing patterns their scholars and researchers use. The initial
list of candidate references was established by OST. It was constituted of references observed in the
publications ﬁltered out on a precise geographic basis (post codes provided by the institutions). This
work is done on a yearly basis and concerns the 106 French universities and Grandes Ecoles which
are associated to the French ministry of research and higher Education and which are not totally
specialized in the social sciences and/or humanities.6 Out of the 106, 5 (mainly small universities
and schools) decided not to participate in the project which leaves us with 101 institutions covered
by the study.
The publication and citation data come from the SCI-expanded database (Thomson-Reuters)
which constitutes a reference product in scientometrics studies. It is recording the standard scientiﬁc
information of all articles published in a maintained list of about 6,500 journals. These journals are
selected on the basis of their impact factor, their regularity and the respect of some editorial criteria
(like peer review, rules for referencing authors and cited articles). The journals are associated to
detailed scientiﬁc domains (potentially to several ones) which can be aggregated in nine large domains.
The eight ﬁrst, exposed in Table 1, correspond to clear disciplinary lines of inquiry, whereas the
ninth, labeled Multidisciplinary Sciences, corresponds mainly to those well established journal in
which articles from diﬀerent disciplines can be published. So as to correct for the bias that would
constitute the elimination of a signiﬁcant share of the best articles of all disciplines, the articles
published in PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA), Science and Nature
have been reallocated to their parent discipline thanks to a lexicographic work.
Since the cleaned publication data are available only from 2002, and that the citations data
available only until year 2006, a two-years publications period (2002 and 2003) and a three-years
citations window (2002, 2003 and 2004 for year 2002 and 2003, 2004 and 2005 for year 2003) were
selected.
6.2 Computing scientiﬁc production
This subsection exposes how the publication performance is computed from the SCI-expanded database
on publications and citations. Several measures could be used.7 In this article we use the so called
6The study thus deos not concern the schools which are associatd to other ministeries (Defense, Industry and
Agriculture mainly).
7We have also tested the number of papers in which each institution was mentioned. This measure meets the critics
that articles usually reference several institutions which reﬂect either the copublication between scholars aﬃliated to
diﬀerent institutions or the aﬃliation of scholars to diﬀerent institutions, and that journals can also be associated to
several domains. Since in addition to those crittics, it does not change the results, we do not presents the results on
this measure.
8fractional count measure. An article a, referencing at least one address associated to institution i,
brings a score of:
pk
i,a =
#{i mentioned in a}
#{j|j mentioned in a}
×
1{j(a) associated to domain k}
#{k|j(a) associated to k}
. (3)
The function 1{.} is the indicator function which is equal to 1 if the condition into brackets is equal
to one and zero otherwise. The expression #{.} denotes the cardinal of the set deﬁned into brackets.
The ﬁrst ratio of the right hand side of 3 is the weight associated to the institution i. The second
ratio ﬁlters and weights for the domain k.





￿ ￿∀s ∈ N
￿
is computed by summing over all articles a and ﬁltering out the article scores in






i,a × 1{a received s citations}.
6.3 Tests and calibration
Out of all the dominance relations introduced so far, we are concerned with the appropriate and
robust manners to rank universities and to build reference classes. More speciﬁc questions can be
addressed such as: are dominance relations complete over the set of French institutions? We will see
that we have mainly negative results in this respect: complete ranking can often not be produced
and, when it can be produced, it is only on very small share of the scientiﬁc production. Then,
we turn toward the pseudo dominance ranking exercise and show how it can be implemented. We
discuss the sensibility of the technique with the associated types of dominance relations.
6.3.1 The completeness of dominance relations





(i,j) ∈ I2 |i > j,i ≻ j or j ≻ i
￿
#{(i,j) ∈ I2 |i > j}
, (4)
which simple indicates the share of pairs of (distinct) institutions for which one can establish (at
least) one dominance relation of type ≻. The rates of completeness of dominance relations ◮,⊲, 
,◮.5,⊲.5, .5,◮.1,⊲.1, .1 are given in Table 2. Though the results show that completeness varies
across domains and types of dominance. Engineering sciences exhibit signiﬁcantly lower rates than
other disciplines across all dominance relations. Other disciplines exhibit high rates mostly between
60 and 90%.
It is to be noticed that none of the dominance relations exposed in Table 2 are I-complete (the
rates are below the unity) and so no complete dominance ranking can be constructed on the basis
of such dominance relations. Incomplete dominance relations can be pictured using the dominance
networks notion. Adjusted dominance networks of French universities in Physics are pictured in
Figure 1.
9A diﬀerent manner to handle the issue is to ﬁnd, for each type of dominance (strong dominance,
dominance, weak dominance), the largest φ such that such dominance relation is I-complete. Such
largest φ are given in Table 3. The results indicate that complete dominance relations can be
established only when one restricts to articles which are among less the .01% most cited ones (in the
world) for all ﬁelds but Chemistry, Physics and Science of the Universe which have their largest φs
always less than .03%. These results hold because, for all disciplines, it is quite diﬃcult establish
dominance relation among the most performing institutions.
6.3.2 Pseudo rankings and reference classes
Unlike the complete dominance ranking, pseudo dominance rankings can be built for any dominance
relation. We provide in Table 4 an example of the top ranking (sixth ﬁrst) in the ﬁeld of physics for
diﬀerent types of dominance relations.
We also measure of the degree of dissimilarity between pseudo rankings based on diﬀerent domi-
nance relations with the following index:
D≻,≻′ =
P




where ri is the rank of institution i according to the pseudo ranking based on dominance relation ≻,
and r′
i is its rank according to dominance relation ≻′. If the two ranking are maximally dissimilar,
that index is equal to the unity whereas it is equal to zero if they are identical.
We compare pseudo rankings operated with strong domination, domination and weak domination
computed for three given shares of the most visible papers in the diﬀerent ﬁelds k. For all domains,
we ﬁnd that the largest degree of dissimilarity is between the pseudo rankings build upon strong
dominance and weak dominance relations. Dissimilarity is minimal between rankings built upon
dominance and weak dominance relations. Lastly, dissimilarity decreases when one restricts to smaller
shares of the most cited papers. Again leaving aside Engineering sciences, the dissimilarity between
dominance and weak dominance rankings is never greater than 4% and is most of the time lower
than 3%, which corresponds to a quite reduced volatility across ranking procedures.
References classes are to be built upon the impossibility to establish dominance relations between
pairs of institutions. The nice property of reference classes (synthesized in Theorem 11) is that the
weaker the associated dominance relation, the more the reference class is reduced to a smaller set
of institutions. Therefore it is possible to adjust the size of the reference class by strengthening or
weakening the associated dominance relation (see Table 6).
7 Conclusion
This article introduces a new economic theory for establishing binary dominance relations by disci-
plines between the scientiﬁc production of any set of institutions. As illustrated with the scientiﬁc
production of French Universities, such a theory can ground several ranking procedures and building
reference classes. Therefore, it may become a tool in the benchmarking of universities. Neverthe-
less, further developments are still needed towards developing an interdisciplinary approach, assessing
statistical signiﬁcance of dominance relations as well as further testing on diﬀerent sets of institutions.
108 References
Atkinson A.B., 1987, On the measurement of poverty, Econometrica, 55, 749-764.
Beilock R. P., Polopolus L. C., Correal M., 1986, Ranking of Agricultural Economics Departments
by Citations. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68, 595-604.
Cox R.A., Chung K.H., 1991, Patterns of research output and author concentration in the eco-
nomic literature, Review of Economics and Statistics 73 (4), 740-747.
Lotka, A. J. 1926, Statistics - the frequency distribution of scientiﬁc productivity. Journal of the
Washington Academy of Science 16, 317- 25.
Lubrano M., Protopopescu C., 2004, Density inference for ranking european research systems in
the ﬁeld of economics, Journal of Econometrics 123, 345-369.
Meyer, J., 1977, Second degree stochastic dominance with respect to a function. International
Economic Review 18, 477-487.
Murphy L., 1973, Lotka’s Law in the humanities, Journal of the American Society for Information
Science 24, 461-462.
Palacios-Huerta I., Volij O., 2004, The measurement of intellectual inﬂuence. Econometrica 72,
963-977.
Radhakrishnan T. et Kernizan R., 1979, Lotka’s law and computer science literature, Journal of
the American Society for Information Science, 30, p. 51-54.
von Neumann, J., Morgenstern atld O., 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
9 Appendix A.
9.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The if and only if statement shall be proven by demonstrating that the causality holds both ways.
i) We ﬁrst demonstrate the left-to-right implication: i ◮k j → ∀x ∈ [0,∞[,fk
i (x) ≥ fk
j (x).
Let us consider that i ◮k j holds and let us further assume that there exists an x0 ∈ [0,∞[ such
that fk
i (x0) < fk











. For instance, if v(.) is such that v(x0) > 0 and v(x) = 0 otherwise,
then obviously fk
i (x0) < fk






i (s)ds. We thus obtain a
contradiction with the initial statement i ◮k j. Thus the inequality fk
i (x) ≥ fk
j (x) is always veriﬁed
when i strongly dominates j. 
ii) The right-to-left implication, ∀x ∈ [0,∞[,fk
i (x) ≥ fk
j (x) → i ◮k j, is immediate.
Indeed when ∀x ∈ [0,∞[,fk
i (x) ≥ fk
j (x), we can multiply both sides by any non negative function
v(.) and the inequality still holds for all x ∈ [0,∞[. We can also integrate both sides of the inequality






j (s)ds, that is i strongly dominates j. 
9.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The if and only if statement shall again be proven by demonstrating that the causality holds both
ways.














For any (non negative and non decreasing) function v(.) such that v(s) = v0 > 0 if s ≥ x0 and


























is satisﬁed for all x ∈ [0,∞[ when i ⊲k j.  







→ i ⊲k j.






j (s)ds. Let us further assume that institution
i does not dominates institution j. Thus, there exists an x0 ∈ [0,∞[ and a non negative and non


















j (s)ds. For instance assuming that v(.) is such that














j (s)ds for all x ∈ [0,∞[. 
9.3 Proof of Lemma 3.
The if and only if statement shall again be proven by demonstrating that the causality holds both
ways.













j (s)ds. The last






j (s)ds when the function v is such
that v(x) = x. That inequality contradicts the initial statement. Accordingly, if the institution i














j (s)ds → i  k j.




























6 Science of the universe
7 Engineering sciences
8 Mathematics
Table 1. The domains.
13dominance relations
domains ◮ ⊲   ◮.5 ⊲.5  .5 ◮.1 ⊲.1  .1
1 Fund. bio 0.54 0.79 0.85 0.56 0.81 0.86 0.74 0.89 0.91
2 Medicine 0.60 0.82 0.88 0.62 0.84 0.88 0.77 0.90 0.92
3 Ap. bio./ecol. 0.63 0.81 0.87 0.65 0.83 0.87 0.75 0.89 0.91
4 Chemistry 0.41 0.71 0.78 0.43 0.73 0.79 0.54 0.80 0.84
5 Physics 0.43 0.72 0.79 0.46 0.73 0.80 0.60 0.82 0.85
6 Sc. universe 0.55 0.77 0.84 0.58 0.80 0.85 0.73 0.89 0.91
7 Engineering 0.31 0.60 0.70 0.31 0.60 0.70 0.35 0.67 0.74
8 Maths 0.53 0.72 0.80 0.53 0.72 0.80 0.59 0.78 0.83
Table 2. The rate of completness of a series of dominance relations over the set of 101 French
higher Education and research institutions.
141 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
◮ .009 .004 .005 .022 .016 .019 .002 .009
⊲ .009 .004 .008 .024 .016 .026 .002 .009
  .009 .004 .008 .024 .052 .026 .007 .009
Table 3. The largest φ (when it exists) such that such dominance relation is I-complete over the
set of 101 French higher Education and research institutions.
15physics dominance relations
◮ ⊲   ◮.5 ⊲.5  .5 ◮.1 ⊲.1  .1
universities ri ni ri ni ri ni ri ni ri ni ri ni ri ni ri ni ri ni
U. Paris 6 1 78 1 99 1 99 1 78 1 99 1 99 1 78 1 99 1 99
U. Paris Sud 11 2 70 2 98 2 98 2 70 2 98 2 98 2 70 2 98 2 98
ENS Paris 4 60 3 95 3 97 4 60 3 96 3 97 4 60 3 97 2 98
U. Strasbourg 1 8 52 4 89 4 93 8 52 4 89 4 93 8 52 4 91 4 94
U. Grenoble 1 3 63 5 87 5 90 3 63 5 87 5 90 3 63 5 87 5 90
INPG 6 54 6 77 6 85 6 54 6 77 6 85 6 54 6 77 6 85
Table 4. Top-ranked French higher Education and research institutions according to pseudo
dominance ranking build upon three dominance relations.
16◮ ⊲   ◮.5 ⊲.5  .5 ◮.1 ⊲.1  .1
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
Fund. bio ⊲ .041 ⊲.5 .044 ⊲.1 .037
  .054 .027  .5 .054 .022  .1 .038 .014
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
Medicine ⊲ .045 ⊲.5 .043 ⊲.1 .028
  .065 .029  .5 .056 .021  .1 .036 .014
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
App. bio. ⊲ .049 ⊲.5 .050 ⊲.1 .041
  .071 .034  .5 .063 .025  .1 .052 .018
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
Chemistry ⊲ .072 ⊲.5 .067 ⊲.1 .067
  .096 .033  .5 .083 .025  .1 .080 .020
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
Physics ⊲ .050 ⊲.5 .058 ⊲.1 .061
  .075 .036  .5 .075 .028  .1 .074 .021
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
Sc. univ. ⊲ .047 ⊲.5 .058 ⊲.1 .043
  .072 .035  .5 .076 .025  .1 .052 .012
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
Engin. ⊲ .079 ⊲.5 .079 ⊲.1 .098
  .107 .045  .5 .107 .045  .1 .111 .032
◮ ◮.5 ◮.1
Maths ⊲ .063 ⊲.5 .063 ⊲.1 .059
  .082 .036  .5 .082 .036  .1 .076 .030
Table 5. The degree of similarity between pseudo rankings based on diﬀerent dominance relations
over the set of 101 French higher education and research institutions.
17dominance relations
domains ◮ ⊲   ◮.5 ⊲.5  .5 ◮.1 ⊲.1  .1
1 Fund. bio 47(21) 22(12) 16(9) 45(22) 20(12) 15(9) 27(23) 12(11) 10(9)
2 Medicine 41(20) 19(10) 13(8) 39(20) 17(10) 13(8) 24(22) 11(11) 9(9)
3 Ap. bio./ecol. 38(22) 20(13) 14(10) 36(23) 18(13) 14(10) 26(22) 12(11) 10(9)
4 Chemistry 60(20) 30(13) 23(11) 58(21) 28(13) 22(11) 47(26) 21(14) 17(11)
5 Physics 58(18) 29(13) 22(11) 55(21) 27(13) 21(11) 41(26) 19(15) 16(13)
6 Sc. universe 46(20) 24(13) 17(10) 43(21) 21(13) 16(11) 28(21) 12(9) 10(7)
7 Engineering 70(19) 41(15) 31(13) 70(19) 41(15) 31(13) 66(21) 34(15) 27(13)
8 Maths 48(23) 29(15) 21(12) 48(23) 29(15) 21(12) 42(24) 23(15) 18(12)
Table 6. The average size (std. errors) of reference classes in the diﬀerent domains according to
diﬀerent dominance relations.
18Figure 1. Adjusted dominance networks   g′ built for dominance relations ⊲.5
5 (left graph) and ⊲.05
5
(left graph) (domain 5 is Physics).
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